Boundary Monism

About

What this is

Boundary Monism is a philosophical position about where experience sits in the physical world. It joins a long conversation: how a world described entirely by physics can contain anything it is like to be. Answers range from adding something new to physics to treating experience as an illusion. This one takes a narrower route and asks which physical things are subjects, and what their experience consists of, using the physics there already is.

The picture is simple to state. The world is one ongoing process, and some regions of it hold together by their own dynamics: an atom, a storm, a cell. A few of these keep a record of the world that also tracks how reliable that record is. The position identifies experience with such a self-tracking record as it is from inside, so that what it is like to be a subject is the shape of what its record can tell apart.

If that is right, questions that usually stay open become questions about the dynamics: which systems have experience, where one experience ends and another begins, why experience comes in unified and bounded wholes, and why its qualities have the structure they do. They are the questions people ask about animals, infants, machines and split brains, and about their own experience.

The identity at the centre cannot be proved. It is offered as a position, and argued for. The rest of the site gives it a footing: the ladder walks from the foundations of quantum theory up to subjects one established step at a time, so a reader can see what the identity rests on and judge it for themselves. The position sits close to process philosophy, integrated information theory, active inference and quality-space accounts of experience, and leans on each where it fits.

How the work got here

Boundary Monism replaces an earlier framework, Projective Process Monism. Its qualitative picture survives in outline: one timeless space of possible states, a subject as whatever stays consistent with itself under the dynamics, and a projection that ends in a discrete event. Its specific geometric and numerical claims, which tried to read physical constants and the structure of experience off particular geometric spaces, did not hold up. They were retired, along with the papers that made them.

A broader, open-ended exploration of what any total theory of mind and reality would have to supply produced a paper setting out a net of necessary conditions. Working through it clarified the piece the earlier picture had been missing, a criterion for what counts as a thing, and Boundary Monism grew out of following that idea through. The net stands as its own work and stays on this site.

Following it through meant building the argument on established physics and information theory wherever they reach, so that as little as possible beneath the identity at the top is new. Where a step needed something the existing work did not supply, it was worked out and checked on small models to see that it holds together. The definitions, proofs and computations were produced with AI assistance under the author’s direction, and no independent physicist has yet checked them.

Several things failed along the way. An early form of the criterion asked every candidate for the same fixed tolerance. On random lattices this turned out to be a cut on the degree that weakly held systems could not meet, and a graded form replaced it. A requirement that a thing be copied into its environment added nothing in tests and was dropped.

Some problems are open. The criterion does not yet keep things at one level disjoint: it can join to a thing an unrelated part that has no level of its own, and in one designed case three spins that do not interact came back as a single thing. A repair that requires the parts of each smallest region to interact is being tested. The evidence for the subject test comes from two designed models run under the earlier form of the criterion, with thin margins, and is due to be rerun. No check so far bears on systems nobody designed.

For the author’s own account, see About me.